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PROCEDURE FOR PUPILS:
WHAT CONSTITUTES DUE PROCESS IN A
UNIVERSITY DISCIPLINARY HEARING?
I.

INTRODUCTION

Imagine that you are a student in a public university, college, or
graduate school;1 you’ve likely spent thousands, if not tens of thousands, of
dollars in pursuit of your education.2 You have also invested many years in
college. You know that your future happiness, income, and quality of life
are contingent upon your personal and academic reputation in that setting as
well as earning your degree.3 One day, you are called into the dean’s office
or, perhaps, some other university official’s office. You are informed that
you have been accused of committing an act that warrants a disciplinary
hearing to determine whether you will receive a significant suspension or
even expulsion.4
1. See, e.g., Dixon v. Ala. Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 157-58 (5th Cir. 1961) (identifying the
differences between public and private universities with respect to the applicability of constitutional due process claims alleging due process deprivations). The Dixon court noted one may
have a constitutional due process claim against a public university but not against a private university because the court found that there was a “well-settled rule that the relations between a student
and a private university are a matter of contract.” Id. at 157.
2. See COLLEGE BOARD, TRENDS IN HIGHER EDUCATION SERIES: TRENDS IN COLLEGE
PRICING 5 (2005), http://collegeboard.com/press/releases/48884.html (follow “Trends in College
Pricing 2005 (.pdf1/MB)” hyperlink) (“Average published tuition and fees in 2005-06 are $5,491
at public four-year colleges and universities . . . and $21,235 at private nonprofit four-year colleges and universities.”). On average, over the last decade, the tuition and fees at public universities have risen at the rate of 6.9 percent per year or 4.4 percent per year after inflation. Id. at 10.
3. Dixon, 294 F.2d at 157-58. The Dixon court stated that no argument was required
to demonstrate that education is vital and, indeed, basic to civilized society. Without
sufficient education the plaintiffs [the students facing expulsion] would not be able to
earn an adequate livelihood, to enjoy life to the fullest, or to fulfill as completely as
possible the duties and responsibilities of good citizens.
Id. at 157. See also Walter Saurack, Note, Protecting the Student: A Critique of the Procedural
Protection Afforded to American and English Students in University Disciplinary Hearings, 21
J.C. & U.L 785, 785-86 (1995) (providing that students involved in disciplinary hearings, when
compared to those who are not, may be rejected in admissions to other universities, receive lower
pay upon earning a degree and gaining employment, and suffer serious emotional distress).
4. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583-84 (1975) (explaining that procedural due process
measures become a greater concern in university disciplinary hearings when there is the potential
for a significant suspension or expulsion); see generally Gorman v. Univ. of R.I., 837 F.2d 7 (1st
Cir. 1988) (stating that there is a need for more stringent procedural protections where the accused
student faces severe punishment). See also Johnson v. Collins, 233 F. Supp. 2d 241, 248 (N.D.
Me. 2002) (reaffirming the proposition that more extended suspensions and expulsions, perhaps a
period of ten days or more, invoke more stringent due process protections, but that shorter
suspensions, those under ten days, still invoke some amount of due process protection).
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You have no idea what to expect in a university disciplinary hearing,
but at the same time, you are fully aware of the fact that your reputation and
future rest upon the outcome of this hearing.5 You probably have many
questions about your upcoming hearing. How much time do I have to
prepare for my hearing?6 What am I being accused of?7 What kind of
evidence is there against me?8 Can I call a lawyer to represent or assist me
at the hearing?9 What can I say on my own behalf?10 Can I question the
witnesses who will speak against me at the hearing?11 Who will decide
whether I actually performed the alleged bad act?12 How much does the
university have to prove to suspend or expel me?13 With the growing
importance of education in our society and the great number of students
who attend public universities, colleges, or graduate schools, these legal
questions are important to the individual student, the courts, and society at
large.14
5. See Saurack, supra note 3, at 821. Although university students may be literate and
educated adults, they are often “inexperienced” in understanding and applying even basic procedural rules that govern disciplinary hearings. Id. The lack of experience, coupled with emotions
such as fear and anger, creates an “inability to articulate their stor[ies],” and, therefore, students
find it difficult to wage an adequate defense. Id.
6. See, e.g., Nash v. Auburn Univ., 812 F.2d 655, 661 (11th Cir. 1987) (describing the
controversy and ambiguity that exist with respect to the amount of time that the university or
college must provide to the student in preparation for a disciplinary hearing).
7. See, e.g., id. at 662 (providing the basic content that must be present in the notice of the
disciplinary hearing to the student). The content, at a minimum, should explain the accusation or
charge against the student. Dixon, 294 F.2d at 157.
8. See, e.g., Ctr. for Participant Educ. v. Marshall, 337 F. Supp. 126, 136 (N.D. Fla. 1972)
(explaining the proposition that a student should be afforded some information concerning the
names of the witnesses who will testify and a summary of the testimony each will present).
9. See, e.g., Gabrilowitz v. Newman, 582 F.2d 100, 100-07 (1st Cir. 1978) (analyzing when,
if ever, a student in a college or university hearing should be afforded the right to an attorney).
10. See, e.g., Keene v. Rogers, 316 F. Supp. 217, 221 (N.D. Me. 1970) (standing for the
proposition that fairness in a disciplinary hearing requires a student be afforded the opportunity to
speak on his own behalf).
11. See, e.g., id. (finding that the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses was
instrumental in achieving fairness in a university disciplinary hearing).
12. See, e.g., Nash, 812 F.2d at 665 (stating that sufficient process would also require an
impartial fact finder to determine the guilt of the student at the university disciplinary hearing).
While there is no legal disagreement that an impartial fact finder is necessary for due process,
controversy frequently arises over who may serve as that impartial fact finder. See, e.g., Saurack,
supra note 3, at 817 (arguing that “[w]hen a university melds together the roles of prosecutor,
enforcer, and adjudicator, the functions of each role no longer check one another.”).
13. See, e.g., Keene, 316 F. Supp. at 221 (discussing the requirement that a student be
suspended or expelled only “on the basis of substantial evidence” presented during the
disciplinary hearing). As discussed in the limitations on scope, see infra note 18, this note will not
examine the quantum of evidence (e.g., probable cause, preponderance, clear and convincing, or
beyond a reasonable doubt) required to achieve due process in a university disciplinary hearing.
14. See Johnson v. Collins, 233 F. Supp. 241, 251 (N.D. Me. 2000) (standing for the
proposition that education is of monumental importance to both the individual student, society,
and the government). See also NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC.,
Historical Summary of Faculty, Students, Degrees, and Finances in Degree-Granting Institutions:
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The purpose of this note is to examine the state of existing due process
law in public universities, colleges, and graduate institutions. This note also discusses the procedures that public universities must provide to students
during the course of a disciplinary hearing in order to achieve fundamental
fairness or due process. Part II discusses the development of Fourteenth
Amendment due process law in university settings.15 Parts III through VII
discuss the application of that law and what procedures, if any, universities
should or must provide to students who face these hearings under certain
factual circumstances.16 Part VIII of this note will present several personal
conclusions about the state of due process law in university disciplinary
hearings.
This note will be limited to discussion and examination of only
procedural due process issues 17 that may arise in this setting.18 Substantive

Selected Years, 1869-70 through 2003-04, http://nces.ed.gov/programs/d97/d97t171.asp (last
visited May 22, 2006) (providing, among other information, the staggering increase in number of
post-secondary institutions from 1869 to 2004). In 1869, there were only 563 post-secondary
institutions in existence in the United States. Id. By 2004, the number of institutions skyrocketed
to 4,236. Id. In the 1869-70 academic year, only 9,371 students earned bachelor’s degrees. Id.
By the 2003-04 academic year, 1,399,542 students earned bachelor’s degrees. Id. These increases
evidence the growing importance of post-secondary education in America.
15. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
16. See, e.g., Flaim v. Med. Coll. of Ohio, 418 F.3d 629, 636-37 (6th Cir. 2005) (providing
that the Due Process Clause “sets only the floor or lowest level of procedures acceptable” but also
admitting the university’s rules were “far from ideal and certainly could have been better”). In
essence, what a university should ideally provide to students faced with disciplinary hearings is
not necessarily what it must provide according to the Constitution. Id.
17. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (explaining that procedural due
process, under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, refers to the right to
fundamentally fair procedures before the government can deprive a citizen of a liberty or property
interest). A life, liberty, or property interest must be implicated to invoke the due process protections of the Fourteenth Amendment; liberty and property interests are implicated in disciplinary
hearings that threaten to suspend or expel a student at a post-secondary institution. See, e.g.,
Saurack, supra note 3, at 786-88 (citing Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 572-73 (1975)) (providing
that property and liberty interests are implicated in public university disciplinary proceedings).
18. Although not discussed in this note, “substantial” evidence in support of guilt and guilt
warranting punishment are often regarded as fundamental procedural requirements in university
disciplinary hearings. Keene, 316 F. Supp. at 221. See generally Nicholas T. Long, The Standard
of Proof in Student Disciplinary Cases, 12 J.C. & U.L. 71 (1985) (arguing that the “substantial”
evidence requirement in these hearings should actually become a clear and convincing standard of
evidence before suspensions or expulsions can occur). Also not discussed, but generally found to
be essential to achieving procedural due process in these settings, is the requirement that findings
of the tribunal be made in writing. Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807, 813 (2d Cir. 1967). See
also Charles A. Wright, The Constitution on Campus, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1027, 1071-72 (1969)
(arguing that written findings with respect to evidence of guilt or innocence are due process
requirements). But see Flaim, 418 F.3d at 636 (citing Jaksa v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 597 F.
Supp. 1245, 1252 (E.D. Mich. 1984)) (“It is always wise to produce some sort of record of the
proceedings, . . . though a record may not always be constitutionally required.”).

970

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL . 82:967

due process claims will not be addressed.19 This note will not discuss
sufficient process with respect to private universities.20 There will be little
or no discussion of the specific claims that a student may allege or possible
remedies that she may be afforded in bringing claims of procedural due
process violations against her state university. This note also disregards
other related issues such as immunity and official or individual liability for
due process deprivations when these claims arise.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS LAW IN
UNIVERSITY DISCIPLINARY SETTINGS
A. THE STATE UNIVERSITY MEETS THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION
The right to due process arises under the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution.21 “The Fourteenth Amendment forbids the
State[s] to deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law.”22 Essentially, procedural due process23 requires that the
party who is subject to the potential deprivation of a life, liberty, or property
interest be afforded a fair and meaningful opportunity to tell his or her side
of the story before the State takes away that protected interest.24
Classifying the state university as the “State” was one of the first
hurdles the courts had to face in determining whether a student could
effectively allege a constitutional due process violation against a state
university.25 A university is clearly not a “State” within the plain meaning
19. See, e.g., Pittsley v. Warish, 927 F.3d 3, 6 (1991) (explaining that substantive due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment refers to the right of citizens to be free from governmental deprivation of a right regardless of how fair the procedures for such a deprivation may be).
20. See discussion infra note 25 (explaining that private universities, at least those classed as
private actors, would likely not be subject to the procedural constraints imposed on public or state
actor universities).
21. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The relevant portion of this Amendment reads: “No State
shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” Id. The right
to procedural due process is also guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. U.S. CONST. amend. V. However, the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of procedural
due process restricts the federal government and its actors, and is, therefore, not particularly
relevant for the purposes of constitutional due process guarantees with respect to state universities.
Id.
22. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 572 (1975).
23. See supra notes 17 and 19 (distinguishing procedural due process from substantive due
process).
24. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (explaining that procedural due
process requires an opportunity to speak on one’s own behalf at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful way).
25. See Carol J. Perkins, Sylvester v. Texas Southern University: An Exception to the Rule of
Judicial Deference to Academic Decisions, 25 J.C. & U.L. 399, 404-06 (1998) (discussing the
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of the word.26 To transform the state university into the State itself, and
thereby invoke at least minimal Fourteenth Amendment protections, the
United States Supreme Court explained that there must be “a sufficiently
close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the regulated
entity so that the action of the latter may fairly be treated as that of the State
itself.”27 That is to say, the university can be held to have violated the
constitutionally guaranteed due process rights of the student only if the
university can be classed as a “state actor” by showing that “the State was
sufficiently involved to treat that decisive conduct [on the part of the
university] as state action.”28
The actor (i.e., university) in question can be classified and treated as
the State by a showing that either the State created the framework
governing the conduct of the actor,29 the State delegated its authority to the
actor,30 or the State knowingly accepted the benefits derived from the
unconstitutional behavior.31 Because the State often benefits from its state
universities, by way of a university’s prestige or ability to create increased
economic activity within the state, coupled with the fact that the state
university is state-funded, the courts seem to have little or no trouble
reaching the conclusion that state universities can be fairly treated as state
actors.32 The state actor doctrine effectively allows the courts to transform
the state university into the State itself, and therefore subject the state
university to the restraints of the Fourteenth Amendment.33

state actor doctrine which, under certain conditions, allows the courts to treat both public and, at
times, private universities as the state itself, and therefore, subject those institutions to the
restraints of the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Tarkanian,
488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988) (explaining that the Fourteenth Amendment protects only against
injurious actions taken by the State or state actors, and that private actors are not constrained by
the due process requirements inherent in the Fourteenth Amendment).
26. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1443 (8th ed. 2004).
27. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 192 n.12 (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351
(1974)).
28. Id. at 192; see also Perkins, supra note 25, at 404-06 (discussing generally the
development and application of the state actor doctrine).
29. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 192 (citing N. Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601
(1975)).
30. Id. at 192 (citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988)).
31. Id. (citing Burton v. Wilmington Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961)).
32. See, e.g., id. (stating that “[a] state university without question is a state actor”); Donohue
v. Baker, 976 F. Supp. 136, 142 (N.D.N.Y 1997) (finding that there was no issue as to whether the
state university in this case was a state actor).
33. See Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 190 (citing Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937
(1982)) (explaining that private entities can be treated as states for the purpose of implicating the
Fourteenth Amendment so long as the requirements of the state actor doctrine are met).
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B. DIFFERENT KIND OF STATE ACTOR
1.

The Doctrine of In Loco Parentis

If it is clear that a “state university is without question a state actor,” 34
why have courts historically been reluctant to weigh in on the procedures
employed by universities to discipline students and the outcomes they
reach?35 Why have the courts decided that the full-scale procedural due
process requirements characteristic of criminal or civil trials are unnecessary in serious university disciplinary settings?36 The reasons likely include
the history of the educational setting,37 the historical view of the student,38
and the evolution of the importance of education within society and the
eyes of the court.39 The university, due in part to its unique history, is
treated with greater deference than the State itself with respect to the
protections the university must provide under the Fourteenth Amendment.40
Arguably, courts of the past were less willing to impose even minimal
rules that might hamper the wide discretion universities enjoyed in
conducting and deciding university disciplinary hearings because of the
applicability of the doctrine of in loco parentis.41 The Latin term in loco

34. Id. at 192.
35. See, e.g., Gomes v. Univ. of Me. Sys., 304 F. Supp. 2d 117, 125 (D. Me. 2004)
(expressing the concern that judicial intervention in educational disciplinary hearings may not be
appropriate in all cases, and such intervention should be exercised with care); see also Dunn v.
Fairfield Cmty. High Sch. Dist. No. 255, 158 F.3d 962, 966 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating that the court
had “concern[s] about transforming the federal courts into the appellate arm of the schools
throughout the country”).
36. See, e.g., Nash v. Auburn Univ., 812 F.2d 655, 664 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing Goss v.
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583 (1975)) (explaining that due process in a university setting does not rise
to the same level as the rights and protections that constitute due process in a civil or criminal
trial).
37. See Perkins, supra note 25, at 406-07 (discussing the influence of in loco parentis on the
history and development of due process in the realm of university disciplinary hearings).
38. See Goss, 419 U.S. at 574 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 506 (1969)) (explaining the view that even students under the age of eighteen are no
longer expected to “‘shed their constitutional rights’ at the schoolhouse door”); see also Perkins,
supra note 25, at 407-09 (discussing the evolution of courts’ view of the legal status of students).
39. See, e.g., Dixon v. Ala. Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 157 (5th Cir. 1961) (discussing the
importance of education to both the student and society at large).
40. See Goss, 419 U.S. at 590-94 (Blackmun and Rehnquist, J.J., dissenting). In the dissent’s
view, there was a need to defer to a school’s judgment in disciplinary matters. Id. According to
the dissent, schools are responsible for maintaining order to foster the education and well-being of
all students; to meet this end they use discipline as a learning tool. Id. Because of these
responsibilities and the necessity of using discipline to carry out these responsibilities, schools
play a role similar to that of parents when deciding the appropriate disciplinary measures. Id.
41. See Booker v. Lehigh Univ., 800 F. Supp. 234, 238 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (stating “[t]here was
a time when college administrators and faculties assumed a role in loco parentis.”) (citations
omitted). See generally Perkins, supra note 25, at 406-07 (explaining the relationship between
student and university under the doctrine of in loco parentis); KERN ALEXANDER & ERWIN S.
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parentis literally means “to stand in the place of a parent.”42 While the
doctrine does not apply directly to the relationship of students and postsecondary institutions today,43 the great discretion the doctrine afforded
universities in the past has certainly left some imprint on the courts of
today.44
Historically, under the in loco parentis doctrine, colleges and
universities were perceived to play a role similar to that of parents while the
students played the role of children.45 A parent would certainly not be
expected to give her child notice and a hearing before administering punishment in an ordinary parent-child relationship, and in loco parentis operated
in roughly the same fashion when applied to post-secondary disciplinary
settings.46 When in loco parentis clearly applied to universities, the university, like the parent, was fully responsible for “the physical and moral
welfare and mental training of the pupils” and, as such, was not required to
provide notice of hearing nor to employ “fair” procedures during the course
of that hearing to administer punishment.47 Based on all of the parent-like
SOLOMAN, COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY LAW 411 (1972) (explaining that historically “in loco
parentis has a surprisingly strong legal basis in higher education.”).
42. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 803 (8th ed. 2004).
43. See Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135, 138-40 (3d Cir. 1979) (finding as a matter of
law that a university did not stand in loco parentis to an eighteen-year-old college student injured
by another student on campus); Booker, 800 F. Supp. at 238-39 (explaining that “[t]he authoritarian role of today’s college administrations has been notably diluted in recent decades” and
“eighteen year old students are now identified with an expansive bundle of individual and societal
interests and possess discrete rights not held by college students from decades past”) (citations
omitted). See generally Perkins, supra note 25, at 406 (noting the decline of the strict use of in
loco parentis in the past).
44. See, e.g., Dixon, 294 F.2d at 160 (Cameron, J., dissenting) (expressing concern about
judicial rulings that affected university disciplinary procedures). The dissent declared that the
majority experienced a “basic failure to understand the nature and mission of schools.” Id.
Schools and students, according to the dissent, are subject to a relationship that the majority did
not grasp in coming to its decision. Id. The school has responsibility for “proper discipline” and
“the morals of the other pupils” at the institution. Id. The dissent argued that the Dixon majority
improperly added “crushing responsibilities” to universities by requiring them to conduct a
hearing when a student faces significant suspension or expulsion. Id. Rather than providing
hearings in these cases and effectively turning the administrators at the university into a
“[g]argantuan aggregation of wet nurses and babysitters,” the court should defer to the school’s
“honest exercise of discretion.” Id. at 160-61. In the dissent’s view, the only time the courts
should interfere or intervene in university disciplinary matters are those “rare” instances where the
school blatantly fails to use proper or honest discretion. Id.
45. Perkins, supra note 25, at 406-07. See also ALEXANDER & SOLOMON, supra note 41, at
411 (“This theory places the school in the place of the parent . . . .”).
46. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 590-94 (1975) (Blackmun and Rehnquist, J.J.,
dissenting) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 524 (1969))
(stating that “[s]chool discipline, like parental discipline, is an integral and important part of
training our children,” and that this heavy parent-like responsibility should not be hampered by
procedural formalities in disciplinary matters that will ultimately diminish the authority of the
school).
47. Perkins, supra note 25, at 406.
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responsibilities that were once possessed by universities, the courts were
highly reluctant to interfere with the disciplinary procedures and decisions
universities made with respect to their students.48
It appears the former use of the doctrine has permanently affected the
way courts perceive the relationship of the student and the university
today.49 Universities are still provided great deference in deciding the fates
of students at university disciplinary hearings.50 The past application of the
doctrine of in loco parentis has arguably left modern courts with the lingering sense that universities are still charged, at least to some degree, with the
parent-like responsibilities of teaching mental and moral skills.51 Thus, even
modern courts are likely to defer to universities to determine the appropriate
discipline for their students.52
2. Historical Student Status, Academic Deference, and the
“Privilege” of Education
The history of the courts’ perception of the student, in addition to the
perception of the university itself, may also help to explain the reason universities are arguably a different kind of state actor.53 Universities, unlike
other state actors, possess remarkable discretion to decide what process is
due at their disciplinary hearings.54 The protections of the Fourteenth
Amendment in past university disciplinary hearings were often nonexistent
due to their inapplicability in this setting and, even today, are often minimal
at best.55
Until the 1960s, the courts considered underage students, even at
universities, to be “second class citizens.”56 Before the 1960s, minors were
48. Id. at 406-07.
49. See, e.g., Gardenhire v. Chalmers, 326 F. Supp. 1200, 1202-03 (D. Kan. 1971) (stating
that the courts “should accept any university procedure which is reasonably calculated to be fair to
the student and lead to a reliable determination of the factual issues involved”).
50. See Gorman v. Univ. of R.I., 837 F.2d 7, 16 (explaining the need for flexibility not only
because it is part of the very nature of due process itself, but also because the court was reluctant
to lessen a university’s ability to use these hearings as a “learning tool”).
51. See, e.g., Gardenhire, 326 F. Supp. at 1201-03 (discussing the responsibilities that
schools have towards their students).
52. See id. at 1202 (finding that university rules and regulations should not be struck down
by the courts under the due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment if the rules are
somewhat reasonable).
53. See, e.g., Booker v. Lehigh Univ., 800 F. Supp. 234, 238-39 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (explaining
the historical view that students at colleges were considered minors for many legal purposes until
the civil rights movement of the 1960s).
54. Perkins, supra note 25, at 407-09.
55. See Booker, 800 F. Supp. at 238-39 (explaining the legally degraded status of students in
the past, which afforded them very few rights). See generally Perkins, supra note 25, at 407-09
(explaining the courts continuing reluctance to weigh in on university disciplinary hearings).
56. Perkins, supra note 25, at 407-09.
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not perceived as the types of “persons” protected under the Fourteenth
Amendment, nor were they fully-realized “persons” for the purposes of
invoking the protections guaranteed by other constitutional rights.57
Students on campus were not fully entitled to invoke certain protections
provided to them in the United States Constitution against state actor
universities because they were lesser citizens by bearing the brand of
“student.”58
Furthermore, because universities were perceived as the experts in
delivering education, the courts were reluctant to criticize or strike down as
unconstitutional the rules, regulations, and manner in which universities
taught or disciplined students within the walls of the university.59 Universities not only historically possessed roles comparable to the role of a
parent, but they were also the “experts” regarding student education and
educational disciplinary measures to foster mental and moral education. 60
The fact that universities were perceived as both parents, under the doctrine
of in loco parentis, and experts in the realm of education, led courts to the
logical conclusion that wide discretion should be afforded to universities in
disciplinary matters.61 The courts of the past were uncomfortable to weigh
in against the decisions of the university, and the courts perceived their lack
of expertise in education and educational disciplinary matters as a
problem.62
Finally, universities were given greater discretion in the past because
former courts placed less value on the pursuit and acquisition of education
with respect to both the individual and society.63 In the past, higher
education was perceived as a mere unprotected privilege.64 There was little
recognition of a constitutionally protected right or interest in education,
and, therefore, the courts of the past did not feel obliged to apply the
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., Booker, 800 F. Supp. at 238-39 (explaining that even students over the age of
eighteen were provided fewer legal rights than other adults because of their status as students).
59. Perkins, supra note 25, at 407-09.
60. Id.; see also Gardenhire v. Chalmers, 326 F. Supp. 1200, 1202-03 (D. Kan. 1971) (stating
that “the courts should be careful not to impose upon the university any specific or particular
procedural framework”).
61. Perkins, supra note 25, at 407-09.
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., Dixon v. Ala. Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 157 (5th Cir. 1961) (discussing the
courts’ changing perception of the importance of education to both individuals and society at
large). See generally Perkins, supra note 25, at 407-09 (explaining the courts’ changing view of
the importance of education).
64. Perkins, supra note 25, at 409. See also ALEXANDER & SOLOMON, supra note 41, at
411-12 (explaining that past courts viewed education as an unconstitutionally protected privilege
until the Supreme Court decided Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and found
education to be a right, at least at the primary and secondary levels of education).
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protections guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to university disciplinary hearings that threatened to or did deprive students of the “privilege” of
higher education.65 Thus, the courts of pre-Dixon era were disinclined to
forcefully weigh into the disciplinary procedures of state universities.
C. THE LANDMARK CASE: DIXON REQUIRES NOTICE AND A HEARING
In Dixon v. Alabama Board of Education,66 the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals decided to look at what was happening behind the walls of
Alabama State College (ASC).67 In Dixon, six African-American students
brought suit against ASC68 after they were expelled for participating in a
civil rights demonstration.69 The students alleged that they were deprived
due process of law upon expulsion.70 All six of these students were in good
academic standing at the time of the expulsion,71 and were expelled from
ASC after the Alabama State Board of Education ordered ASC officials to
expel the students.72 These six plaintiff-students were not given any notice
that participation in the civil rights demonstrations would result in suspension or expulsion, nor were they provided with any type of hearing.73 The
district court upheld the expulsions, finding that ASC was not required to
provide the students with notice or hearings before expelling them.74 The
Fifth Circuit disagreed.75
The Fifth Circuit came to several important revelations in deciding the
Dixon case. First, even if a student’s education was a “privilege” rather
than a right,76 and attendance at a public university was voluntary rather
than compelled as was the case in elementary and secondary education,77
the State could not “condition the granting of even a privilege upon the
renunciation of the constitutional right to procedural due process.”78 The
Fifth Circuit further explained, “The right to notice and a hearing is so fundamental to the conduct of our society that the waiver [of the constitutional

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 409-15.
294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961).
Dixon, 294 F.2d at 152.
See id. at 151 n.1 (describing the complaint filed by the students).
Id. at 152 n.3.
Id. at 151 n.1.
Id. at 152 n.3.
Id. at 151-54.
Id. at 154-55 n.4.
Id. at 155.
Id.
Id. at 156.
Id.
Id.
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right to fundamental elements of procedural due process] must be clear and
explicit.”79 In essence, the Dixon court found that notice and a hearing
were fundamental to achieving due process in a university disciplinary setting, and that students did not waive or renounce their rights to constitutional due process simply because their attendance at the university was
voluntary or perhaps only a privilege.80 Dixon set the stage for students to
protect a privilege under the Fourteenth Amendment which had gone
largely unprotected in the past.81
The Dixon court also opined that the importance of higher education
had become “vital and, indeed, basic to civilized society.”82 The court
noted the importance of education to the individual pursuing it stating that
“[w]ithout sufficient education the plaintiffs [students] would not be able to
earn an adequate livelihood, to enjoy life to the fullest, or to fulfill as completely as possible the duties and responsibilities of good citizens.”83 In
Dixon, the Fifth Circuit openly suggested that the old notion of education as
an unprotected “privilege” was outdated and education was actually more of
a necessity to both the individual and society than past courts acknowledged.84 In this sense, the Dixon court helped to revolutionize the definition of due process in a university disciplinary hearing. The Fifth Circuit
suggested that the pursuit of education was so important that before a
student could be deprived of such an opportunity, the university would have
to ensure some level of protection and fairness inherent in the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Finally, the Dixon court showed less deference to the university than
courts of the past.85 The doctrine of in loco parentis and the past courts’
perception of the “expert” university were less binding on the Dixon
court.86 The Fifth Circuit in Dixon did not completely defer to the decisions
and procedural system created by the expert university.87 While the court
did not prescribe precise procedural rules, telling the university what it had
to do to achieve sufficient process before administering punishment, the
79. Id. at 157.
80. Id.
81. See Booker v. Lehigh Univ., 800 F. Supp. 234, 238-39 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (explaining that
prior to the 1960s, students were provided with very few rights on college campuses).
82. Dixon, 294 F.2d at 157.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Perkins, supra note 25, at 409-15.
86. Dixon, 294 F.2d at 157. The Fifth Circuit in this case chose to consider the importance
of education to both the individual and society. Id. The Dixon court did not pay much attention to
the old notion that universities were expert, parent-like entities that should be afforded great
leeway in deciding all disciplinary rules and procedures with respect to their students. Id.
87. Id. at 159.
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Dixon court told the university what it could not do.88 After Dixon, students
at public universities had at least some comfort in the knowledge that
universities could not arbitrarily exercise the great power of expulsion.89
Dixon required students in jeopardy of suspension or expulsion to be
provided with some notice of the charges and some opportunity to defend
themselves.90
D. THE POST-DIXON ERA
After Dixon, the courts were more inclined to examine, discuss, and
help shape the finer points of university disciplinary hearings.91 The progeny of Dixon have generally found adequate notice, with respect to both
timing and content, to be a fundamental element of due process in a university disciplinary setting.92 The post-Dixon courts have also discussed, at
some length, the right to counsel in these settings and have come to
different conclusions as to whether counsel is essential to achieving
sufficient process.93 Furthermore, the courts have considered whether due
process in a university setting requires the right to cross-examine witnesses
at the hearing.94 The post-Dixon courts have unanimously agreed that an
impartial fact finder is imperative to achieving fairness in any disciplinary

88. See id. at 157-59 (requiring universities to employ elementary principles of fair play and
procedure, such as notice and a hearing, which universities must not deny to students facing
suspension or expulsion).
89. Id. at 157.
90. Id.
91. See, e.g., Nash v. Auburn Univ., 812 F.2d 665 (11th Cir. 1987) (analyzing a variety of
alleged due process violations after students were charged with academic dishonesty, rather than
criminal-like accusations, and faced suspension); Gabrilowitz v. Newman, 582 F.2d 100, 100-07
(1st Cir. 1978) (considering whether procedural due process violations would occur at a university
hearing in which a student was criminally charged with rape and assault and denied the assistance
of counsel); Keene v. Rogers, 316 F. Supp. 217 (N.D. Me. 1970) (discussing the possibility of
due process violations and adopting a list of procedural requirements in deciding the
constitutionality of quasi-military academy disciplinary hearing in which a student was accused of
possessing marijuana and alcohol in violation of academy’s rules).
92. See, e.g., Nash, 812 F.2d at 661-63 (discussing notice requirements as to both content
and timing). See generally Wright, supra note 18, at 1070-72 (discussing the notion that notice
and a hearing are fundamental requirements for due process in student disciplinary hearings).
93. See, e.g., Givens v. Poe, 346 F. Supp. 202, 209 (W.D.N.C. 1972) (finding that access to
counsel was a necessary element of due process); Esteban v. Cent. Mo. State Coll., 277 F. Supp.
649, 651 (W.D. Mo. 1967) (finding counsel necessary to achieve due process in a university
disciplinary hearing). But see Nueze v. Castleton State Coll., 335 A.2d 321, 326 (1975) (finding
that even in the face of pending criminal charges a student was not entitled to an attorney for the
purposes of due process).
94. See Dixon v. Ala. Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 159 (5th Cir. 1961) (finding that the right
to cross-examine witnesses was not necessarily a fundamental aspect of due process in university
disciplinary hearings). But see Winnick v. Manning, 460 F.2d 545, 549-50 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding that when the weight of the evidence against the student is subject to serious issues of credibility, an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses may be a necessary element of due process).

2006]

NOTE

979

hearing,95 but many have also pointed out the inherent difficulty in proving
that the fact finder lacked impartiality in these settings.96
The courts have come a long way by deciding that due process applies
in these higher educational settings and in defining the procedural elements
that may not be ignored by universities in conducting disciplinary hearings.97 Since Dixon, the courts have clearly displayed concern for the protection of the students subject to these hearings. However, because of the
very flexible nature of procedural due process itself and the balancing test
that must be performed on an ad hoc basis, there is still much ambiguity in
discerning when and how certain elements may be necessary to preserve
due process in university disciplinary hearings.98
III. NOTICE
It should be noted from the outset that “[t]here are no hard and fast
rules by which to measure meaningful notice.”99 Notice with respect to
time should be “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances”100 such
that the accused student can prepare to defend herself at her upcoming
hearing.101 As to the content of the notice, there is also no fixed concept; 102
rather, the university must take “rudimentary precautions” to ensure its students are informed of the accusations against them.103 Much like the flexibility in timing, the sufficiency of the content of the notice is highly dependent upon the particular circumstances of each disciplinary hearing.104

95. See, e.g., Winnick, 460 F.2d at 548 (finding that an impartial decision maker is absolutely
essential in achieving due process in these settings).
96. See, e.g., id. (discussing different ways in which a tribunal may be found to lack
impartiality).
97. Compare Keene v. Rogers, 316 F. Supp. 217, 221 (N.D. Me. 1970) (explaining that the
“minimum requirements” for due process in university disciplinary hearings include at least four
elements) with Dixon, 294 F.2d at 158-59 (holding that the minimum requirements of due process
in a university setting are only notice and a hearing).
98. Nash v. Auburn Univ., 812 F.2d 655, 660 (11th Cir. 1987). The Nash court explained
that once it was determined that due process applied in this setting, the court would have to assess
each element of the alleged deprivation of due process by considering the following three factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of
an erroneous deprivation of such an interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally,
the [g]overnment’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Id. (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
99. Id. at 661.
100. Id. (quoting Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 13 (1978)).
101. Id. at 661-62.
102. Id. at 662.
103. Id. (quoting Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581-82 (1975)).
104. Id. at 662.
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A. TIMING
In Nash v. Auburn University,105 the Eleventh Circuit discussed the
sufficiency of the six-day106 period that the accused students were afforded
to prepare for their disciplinary hearings.107 The students in Nash requested
a longer time period to prepare their cases and more specific notice of the
charges at their first hearing.108 The university provided them with two
extra days.109 However, the university did not deliver notice of the
rescheduled date to the students until the day before the rescheduled hearing
was to be held.110 The students argued that one day of notice for their
rescheduled hearing was insufficient, and therefore, violated their rights to
procedural due process.111
In determining whether the timing of the notice was sufficient, the
Nash court discussed both the one-day notice for the students’ rescheduled
hearing,112 and the total time that had accrued between the initial notice of
the disciplinary hearing and the time at which the hearing was actually
conducted.113 The court discussed a line of cases in other administrative
settings, which clearly pointed to the conclusion that one day of notice was
insufficient.114 However, despite this authority, the Eleventh Circuit found
that the students were afforded due process, at least with respect to timing,
for two reasons.115 First, the students did not object to the one-day notice
when they arrived at the rescheduled hearing.116 The students’ failure to
object to the one day notice at the rescheduled hearing constituted
acquiescence to the rescheduled hearing and the notice it carried with it.117
In this regard, even if the notice was insufficient for purposes of due

105. 812 F.2d 655 (11th Cir. 1987).
106. See Nash, 812 F.2d at 661-62 (stating that the six-day period was calculated to include
the time from the initial notice to the date that the rescheduled disciplinary hearing was actually
conducted).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 662. The initial hearing in which the students requested extra time was held on
June 10. Id.
109. Id. The disciplinary hearing was originally scheduled for June 10, but based on the
students’ request for additional time, the university rescheduled the hearing for June 12. Id.
110. Id. The students received notice of the June 12 hearing on June 11. Id.
111. Id. at 661-62.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 662.
114. See id. at 661 (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268 (1970); Walker v. United
States, 744 F.2d 67, 70 (10th Cir. 1984); Wagner v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 373 F. Supp. 876 (E.D.
Ark. 1974)) (supporting the proposition that one day of notice violated due process with respect to
timing).
115. Id. at 661-62.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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process, the students waived their right to argue the insufficiency of the
timing by appearing at the hearing and failing to object to the alleged
insufficiency.118
The Nash court also observed that the students actually ended up with a
total of six days to prepare their defenses from the time of the initial
notice.119 The court suggested that the severity of the alleged misconduct120
and the severity of the punishment that accompanied such an offense121
should be considered in deciding whether or not the timing was adequate.122
However, even in light of these circumstances, the court found the timing
was adequate because it allowed the students to produce witnesses on their
behalf123 and provide documentation in support of their defense.124 The
court also discussed the fact that the students did not request additional time
to prepare at the rescheduled hearing.125
While Nash indicated that six days was enough time to prepare a
defense in this case, the Eleventh Circuit suggested that in other cases,
where the charge and penalty are serious and the student needs more time to
prepare her defense, additional time may be required.126 While the Nash
court was not forced to consider whether due process required the university to grant several extensions between the initial notice and the actual disciplinary hearing127 or past the time allotted in its own regulatory code,128
the case could be read to suggest such a possibility in a different factual
setting.

118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 662. The students were accused of serious academic dishonesty. Id.
121. Id. The plaintiffs were in a graduate school of veterinary medicine and faced suspension if the hearing was not resolved in their favor. Id. at 663.
122. Id. at 662.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 661.
127. Id. The court found that because the students agreed to the rescheduled date, they
waived the opportunity to argue it was unfair. Id. at 661-62. However, a student who does not
acquiesce to the rescheduled date may perhaps be afforded several continuances if her case
warrants the extra time. Id. at 661.
128. Id. The issue was not presented in Nash, but the case indicated that the appropriateness
of timing is contingent on the facts unique to each case, such that a student in need of greater time
to create a meaningful defense would likely have a fair chance at extending the period for
preparation well beyond that provided by the university’s rules or regulations. Id. at 661-62. In
Nash, the university’s code required the university to afford a student only three days to prepare,
but Nash received six. Id. The court found six days, rather than three, to be reasonable and fair
under the circumstances. Id.
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In Donohue v. Baker,129 a federal district court reached a conclusion
similar to that of the Nash court regarding the sufficiency of the timing of
notice130 given to a student charged with sexual misconduct.131 The accused student in Donohue was provided with initial notice by phone and
through his parents.132 The university notified him that he would be called
into a disciplinary hearing three days later.133 Donohue was provided with
written notice only one day before the hearing.134 Like the students in
Nash, the student in Donohue did not object to the time allotted to him by
the university.135 In fact, in Donohue, the accused student “agreed, if not
demanded” to hold the hearing on the date scheduled by the university.136
The Donohue court, like the Nash court, found that the student’s failure to
object constituted a waiver of his possible due process right to greater
notice.137
However, the Donohue court did note that the charge of sexual
misconduct was a serious, rather than minor, accusation.138 Further, since
much of the proceeding required the tribunal to assess the credibility of
witnesses testifying about the sexual assault charge, the student might have
been entitled to more time to prepare his defense if he had objected to the
three-day notice period.139 While the court declined to find three days
insufficient in this case,140 the court did suggest that the severity of the
charge, coupled with the issues of credibility of the witnesses, would probably require more time to prepare a meaningful defense than a less serious
charge with fewer credibility issues.141
Overall, the timing of notice necessary for due process in a university
disciplinary hearing is incredibly flexible.142 However, so long as a student
does not acquiesce to the timing set by the university, the length of time
required to achieve due process should be determined by circumstances
particular to the case, including: (1) the severity of the charge against the

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

976 F. Supp. 136 (N.D.N.Y. 1997).
Donohue, 976 F. Supp. at 146.
Id.
Id. at 145.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 146.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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student;143 (2) the severity of the potential punishment;144 (3) the time
required for a student to access witnesses, documentation, or other evidence
to create a meaningful defense; 145 and (4) the nature of the issues or
evidence that will be heard and presented at the hearing.146
B. CONTENT
Much like the flexibility in timing, the content required for sufficient
notice will vary from case to case based on the unique circumstances
presented in every hearing.147 “The concept of due process is, of necessity,
a flexible one.”148 In Nash, the Eleventh Circuit explained that, at a minimum, “rudimentary precautions”149 must be taken to inform the students of
the “specific charges [against them] and grounds, which if proven, would
justify expulsion [or significant suspension].”150 The Nash court rejected
the argument that students must be provided “the substance of the evidence
to be presented against them,” or that students “were entitled to a summary
of the testimony expected” of the witnesses against them.151 This type of
notice would not be required in cases where the students would be present
at the disciplinary hearing and have the opportunity to confront the
witnesses against them.152 The courts regularly hold that the content of the
notice meets the minimum requirements for specificity so long as it
includes the charge and the grounds upon which the charge rests.153

143. Nash v. Auburn Univ., 812 F.2d 655, 662 (11th Cir. 1987); Donohue, 976 F. Supp. at
145-46.
144. Nash, 812 F.2d at 662.
145. Id.
146. See Donohue, 976 F. Supp. at 146 (indicating that where the quality or weight of the
evidence turns on the credibility of the witnesses involved in the hearing, greater time should be
allowed for preparation). This argument might also be extended to situations where there is a
large quantity of evidence in the case, or perhaps where the evidence is of such complexity that
neither the accused student nor the tribunal would be able to come to accurate conclusions without
additional time for preparation. Id.
147. Id. at 145 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)).
148. Id. (citing Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Miss. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 86 (1978)).
149. Nash, 812 F.2d at 662 (quoting Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581-82 (1975)).
150. Id. at 663 (quoting Dixon v. Ala. Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 158 (5th Cir. 1961)).
151. Id. at 662.
152. Id. at 663.
153. See, e.g., id. at 662-63 (requiring that the notice provides students with the alleged
offense or violation); Dixon, 294 F.2d at 158 (requiring that the notice contains both the alleged
offense and a summary of the evidence that will be used against the student); Gomes v. Univ. of
Me. Sys., 304 F. Supp. 2d 117, 128 (D. Me. 2004) (requiring that students are provided with
notice of the charges against them). See generally Wright, supra note 18, at 1071-72 (discussing
the importance of notice which provides the student with specific charges and the nature of the
evidence against him).
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IV. RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The right to counsel has often been found to be a nonessential element
with respect to achieving a fundamentally fair university disciplinary hearing.154 However, some courts have explicitly155 or implicitly156 suggested
an exception to this rule exists in disciplinary cases which involve serious
accusations of misconduct and when there is or likely will be a criminal
action taken against the student.157 Further, the role counsel intends to play
in the hearing may affect the student’s ability to access counsel under the
above-described circumstances.158 In addition, some courts have considered the complexity of the university’s procedures and if the university is
represented by counsel to determine whether the assistance of counsel is
necessary to satisfy sufficient process.159
A. THE IMPLICATION OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT IN A MAJOR
DISCIPLINARY HEARING
As stated above, the right to counsel, at least in most jurisdictions, is
not deemed to be a procedural “right” essential to achieving due process in
a university disciplinary hearing.160 The right to counsel, or perhaps the
lack thereof, is one of the most troubling areas in determining whether a
student has had a meaningful opportunity to tell her side of the story and
defend against the accusations.161 A student finds herself in a “Catch 22”
when she is faced with a serious accusation from a university which carries
the penalty of significant suspension or expulsion, and, at the same time,
she is or likely will be facing a serious criminal charge arising out of the
same series of events. If she speaks at the university disciplinary hearing
without the advice of counsel, she puts herself in jeopardy of providing
154. Gabrilowitz v. Newman, 582 F.2d 100, 104 (1st Cir. 1978).
155. Id. at 104-06.
156. See Donohue v. Baker, 976 F. Supp. 136, 146 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (indicating that an
accused student may be entitled to an attorney for due process at his university disciplinary
hearing if the attorney will be present to protect the student’s right against self-incrimination
rather than to sway the outcome of the hearing).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Flaim v. Med. Coll. of Ohio, 418 F.3d 629, 640 (2005).
160. See Gabrilowitz, 582 F.2d at 104 (finding that an attorney’s advice and presence at a
disciplinary hearing is a requirement of due process only when the student has an implicated Fifth
Amendment right and is facing a pending criminal charge). But see Keene v. Rogers, 316 F.
Supp. 217, 221 (N.D. Me. 1970) (stating that “the student must be permitted the assistance of a
lawyer, at least in major disciplinary proceedings”). In this jurisdiction, Keene created what
appears to be a bright-line rule for the assistance of an attorney in university disciplinary hearings.
Keene, 319 F. Supp. at 221.
161. See, e.g., Gabrilowitz, 582 F.2d at 104 (discussing whether counsel is necessary to
preserve due process in a university disciplinary hearing).
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what may very well be incriminating statements that could be used against
her in a pending criminal trial.162 However, if she preserves her right to
silence and refuses to participate in or speak during the course of the university disciplinary hearing, she has probably not made a meaningful case
and may well be suspended or expelled from the university after she fails to
openly explain or defend herself.163 In either case, without counsel, the
student lacks the knowledge of an attorney who may be of assistance in
protecting her against incriminating herself, and at the same time, affording
her the opportunity to speak on her own behalf and present a meaningful
defense at the university disciplinary hearing.164
Much like the hypothetical student above, in Gabrilowitz v.
Newman,165 Gabrilowitz, a student at the University of Rhode Island (URI),
was notified by the local police department that he was facing a criminal
charge of assault with intent to rape a fellow university student.166 Shortly
thereafter, URI notified Gabrilowitz of its intention to charge him with assault with intent to rape and with an additional assault charge stemming
from the same incident or series of events that led to his initial criminal
charge.167
The notice of the university disciplinary hearing also described the
procedures and rules the university would employ in conducting the
hearing.168 These rules and procedures explained, among other things, that
Gabrilowitz could not be assisted by counsel nor even have counsel present
at his university disciplinary hearing.169 Gabrilowitz sought an injunction
barring URI from holding his disciplinary hearing until after his pending
criminal case was resolved or until such time that he would be afforded
counsel of his choice to assist him at the disciplinary hearing.170 The
district court issued the injunction; URI appealed.171
The First Circuit Court of Appeals sought to determine whether the
limited172 use of counsel in this situation was appropriate and necessary to

162. Id. at 104-06.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 104.
165. 582 F.2d 100 (1st Cir. 1978).
166. Gabrilowitz, 582 F.2d at 101-02.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 101. The student requested counsel so that “a lawyer [could] be at his side during
the hearing for consultation and advice.” Id. The student did not request the university allow him
to use his counsel to participate in the examination of any witnesses. Id.
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achieve procedural due process, and therefore, whether the district court
properly issued the injunction against URI.173 In assessing whether counsel
would be necessary to ensure sufficient process, the court considered
whether there was an implication of the Fifth Amendment 174 right against
self-incrimination.175 The court found that the Fifth Amendment was
implicated.176 The court noted that, in most instances, a student would not
be deprived of due process in a university disciplinary hearing without the
assistance of counsel.177 However, the court also distinguished those cases
which expressly found the right to counsel to be unnecessary in preserving
a student’s right to due process from Gabrilowitz’s situation.178 The cases
that found no counsel was necessary to preserve a student’s due process
rights lacked the “specter of a pending criminal case hovering over the
hearing.”179 Ultimately, the implication of the Fifth Amendment, the
possibility of a forced Hobson’s choice without his lawyer,180 and the
severity of the pending criminal charge181 rendered an advising attorney
necessary to the preservation of due process in Gabrilowitz’s university
disciplinary hearing.182 Because of the flexibility inherent in university
disciplinary hearings,183 most jurisdictions agree that the assistance of an
attorney is generally not necessary to achieve sufficient process unless there
is an implication of the Fifth Amendment.184

173. Id. at 101, 104.
174. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
175. Gabrilowitz, 582 F.2d at 102-07.
176. Id. at 106.
177. Id. at 104.
178. Id. The court noted that with the exception of two cases, which disallowed students the
use of an attorney, were also cases where the students were not facing pending criminal trials. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. The Hobson’s choice consisted of remaining at the hearing and facing likely
expulsion, or speaking without the advice of an attorney and compromising the right against selfincrimination and jeopardizing the pending criminal trial. Id.
181. Id. at 105. Gabrilowitz faced imprisonment of up to twenty years if found guilty of the
criminal rape charge he faced. Id.
182. Id. at 107.
183. See, e.g., Gorman v. Univ. of R.I., 837 F.2d 7, 12 (1st Cir. 1988) (explaining that the
role of counsel should be limited).
184. Donohue v. Baker, 976 F. Supp. 136 (N.D.N.Y. 1997). In this case, the student faced a
criminal rape charge after local police investigated the incident in question. Id. at 139. The
student’s university charged him with sexual misconduct. Id. at 140. The student alleged a violation of his procedural due process rights because he was not afforded an attorney during the
hearing, but at the same time, he did not allege that the absence of counsel infringed upon his Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination. Id. at 146. Accordingly, the court found that without the implication of the Fifth Amendment, the university’s refusal to allow the assistance of an
attorney did not violate the student’s due process rights in this hearing. Id.
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B. ROLE OF COUNSEL
Once it becomes clear that the charge is serious, there are or likely will
be pending criminal charges, and the assistance of an attorney is necessary
to protect the Fifth Amendment rights of the student, a student must also
explain the role that counsel is to play at the hearing.185 Because the
assistance of counsel is not required to preserve a student’s due process
rights in every university disciplinary hearing,186 the courts also consider
the role that counsel will play at the proceeding.187
If counsel attends the disciplinary hearing in a watchdog or assistance
capacity for the purpose of protecting the implicated Fifth Amendment
rights of the student, then the attorney’s presence and assistance may be a
necessary element of the proceeding.188 However, the attorney likely will
not be necessary to preserve the procedural due process rights of the student
if her presence there is solely because she and her client wish to favorably
affect the outcome of the university disciplinary hearing itself.189 In
Donohue, the court explained this distinction by stating, “In view of the
[self-incrimination] peril faced by the student, . . . a limited role of counsel
[is] necessary, ‘only to safeguard [the student’s] rights at the hearing, not to
affect the outcome of the hearing.’”190 The Donohue court further explained that the role of counsel was not necessary in this case because the
student intended to use counsel “as a sword”191 to challenge the credibility
of the witnesses that would be used against him.192 Counsel would have
been necessary to achieve due process in the hearing only if the student
used his attorney “as a shield to protect his Fifth Amendment rights.”193
Donohue suggested that counsel is only necessary in a disciplinary hearing
when counsel’s role is one in which she serves to protect the student from
self-incrimination, and not when counsel is present to sway the decision of
the hearing tribunal.194

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
original).
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id.
Gabrilowitz, 582 F.2d at 107.
Id. at 106.
Id.
Id.
Donohue, 976 F. Supp. at 146 (quoting Gabrilowitz, 582 F.2d at 106) (emphasis in
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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C. DEVIATION FROM INTERNAL PROCEDURES OR ASSURANCES,
COMPLEXITY OF UNIVERSITY DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES, OR
PRESENCE OF AN ATTORNEY ON BEHALF OF THE UNIVERSITY
The final instances in which a university student may invoke the right
to counsel in a disciplinary hearing arise when: (1) the hearing is governed
by “complex rules of evidence or procedure;” (2) the university is
represented by counsel in the disciplinary hearing; or (3) if the university
deviates from its procedures or assurances and the deviation creates an
unfairness in and of itself.195
The courts have been reluctant to describe with much precision what
constitutes an unfair complexity in university procedure for the purposes of
due process.196 In Flaim v. Medical College of Ohio,197 Flaim, a medical
student, was expelled after he was convicted of a felony drug crime while
attending the institution.198 Following the criminal charge but prior to his
conviction, the medical college informed Flaim that he was suspended until
his criminal proceedings were concluded or until he participated in an
“internal hearing” at the college.199 Flaim decided not to participate in the
internal hearing until his criminal proceedings were completed.200 Following the conclusion of his criminal case, Flaim requested his internal hearing,
and requested the assistance of counsel at that hearing.201 The college told
Flaim that he could have an attorney present at the hearing.202 However,
when the hearing was conducted, the college did not allow Flaim to consult
with his attorney during the hearing, nor was his attorney allowed to
actively participate in the hearing.203 Flaim was formally expelled after the
internal hearing.204 He alleged several due process violations, including an
infringement of his procedural due process right to counsel.205

195. Jaksa v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 597 F. Supp. 1245, 1252 (E.D. Mich. 1984).
196. See, e.g., Flaim v. Med. Coll. of Ohio, 418 F.3d 629, 640 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding that a
medical college’s rules governing a hearing were not overly complex because there were no rules
of evidence, despite the fact that the plaintiff-student felt deceived when the university allegedly
departed from its own assurances regarding assistance of counsel during the proceedings).
197. 418 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2005).
198. Flaim, 418 F.3d at 631-32.
199. Id. at 632.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 632-33.
202. Id. at 633.
203. Id. at 640.
204. Id. at 633.
205. Id. at 640.
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The Sixth Circuit found that Flaim had not suffered a due process
deprivation due to lack of counsel.206 Because his criminal proceedings had
already been decided, the Sixth Circuit found that Flaim was not entitled to
counsel to protect his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.207
Flaim, however, argued that he had a right to the assistance of counsel
based on the fact that the college informed him that he could have counsel
present, and prohibiting him from the assistance of that counsel was
deceptive and unfair due to the fact that he would have to navigate the
procedural aspects of the hearing himself.208
The Sixth Circuit disagreed, stating that even if it were assumed that
Flaim had been assured that he could have active counsel at the disciplinary
hearing, not every deviation from the college’s “regulations [or assurances] . . . give[s] rise to a cause of action for violation of constitutional
rights.”209 The court explained that only when a college or university
disregards its own regulations or assurances and that disregard “results in a
procedure which itself impinges upon [a student’s] due process rights”
should the federal courts intervene in the decisions of state institutions.210
Further, the Sixth Circuit found that the hearing was not so procedurally
complex that Flaim was unfairly disadvantaged by the absence of active
counsel.211 The court agreed that Flaim’s attorney may have been more
articulate “but there [was] no indication that . . . only a trained attorney
could have effectively presented his case.”212 Finally, the Sixth Circuit
hinted that an active attorney for the student may be required to satisfy
constitutional due process in instances where the college is represented by
counsel, but, in Flaim’s hearing, the college did not employ counsel on its
behalf.213

206. Id. at 640-41.
207. Id. at 640. The Sixth Circuit explained that “an accused student [possesses] the right to
counsel only if the student face[s] outstanding criminal charges at the time of the hearing.” Id.
(emphasis in original).
208. Id.
209. Id. (citing Bates v. Sponberg, 547 F.2d 325, 329-30 (6th Cir. 1976)) (brackets in
original).
210. Id.
211. Id. The Sixth Circuit did not detail the procedures or rules employed by the university.
Id. Rather, the court premised this conclusion on the mere fact that “[t]here were no rules of
evidence.” Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. (citing Jaksa v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 597 F. Supp. 1245, 1252 (E.D. Mich.
1984)). But see Saurack, supra note 3, at 821 (stating that even when the university does not
employ an attorney on its behalf, “the university has a greater familiarity with school procedures”
which carries with it an unfair advantage when one considers the student’s lack of experience and
familiarity with the governing procedures).
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V. OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD IN ONE’S OWN DEFENSE
Since Dixon, there has been little or no disagreement concerning the
idea that a student subjected to the possibility of suspension or expulsion
must be afforded the opportunity to speak in her own defense at a university
hearing.214 This part of the note is provided, in part, to help clarify and
deliver additional information concerning the inherent problem with
speaking on one’s own behalf and the possibility of self-incrimination
discussed under Part IV of this note.
The courts have “uniformly held in student discipline cases that ‘fair
process requires . . . an opportunity [for the student] to be heard before the
expulsion or significant suspension’” occurs.215 However, the courts have
also repeatedly found that a student’s right to be heard in her own defense is
not as extensive as it might be in a full-scale criminal trial. Yet, this limited
opportunity to speak in one’s own defense may still be considered sufficient
process for purposes of a disciplinary hearing.216 The courts decide
whether this fundamental aspect of due process has been fulfilled by
determining whether the student “has had an opportunity to answer,
explain, and defend, and not whether the hearing mirrored a common law
criminal trial.”217 It is undeniable that the ability to state one’s own version
of events about the disciplinary matter in question is fundamental to
achieving sufficient process, but it is possible, if not probable, that a student
in a disciplinary hearing may be more limited in delivering her defense than
she would be in an actual judicial setting.
VI. CROSS-EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES
In Dixon, the court stated that a university disciplinary hearing could
not be considered “a full-dress judicial hearing, with the right to crossexamine witnesses” as a requirement in preserving the due process rights of
the student.218 But the Dixon court also concluded that the students in that
case should have been given the names of the witnesses against them and an
oral or written report of the facts to which each witness would testify.219
More recently, courts have adopted a different view of the necessity of
214. See, e.g., Keene v. Rogers, 316 F. Supp. 217, 221 (N.D. Me. 1970) (citing Wright,
supra note 18, at 1071-72) (stating that the student “must be given an opportunity to be heard in
his own defense”).
215. Johnson v. Collins, 233 F. Supp. 2d 241, 248 (N.D. Me. 2002) (quoting Gorman v.
Univ. R.I., 837 F.2d 7, 13 (1st Cir. 1988)).
216. Id. at 248 (quoting Gorman, 837 F.2d at 13).
217. Gorman, 837 F.2d at 14.
218. Dixon v. Ala. Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 159 (5th Cir. 1961).
219. Id.
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cross-examination in achieving due process in university disciplinary
hearings.220
Because “the very nature of due process negates any concept of
inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation,”
some student disciplinary hearings may require the use of crossexamination of witnesses.221 In instances where the credibility of witnesses
is essential to finding a student guilty or innocent of the university’s charge
and determining the severity of the student’s potential suspension or
expulsion, cross-examination may be essential in administering a fair
hearing.222 In these “he-said-she-said” cases, cross-examination may be
essential to due process because the weight the testimony is given will be
highly dependent upon the credibility of the individual witness.223
Statements that will be used as evidence of guilt, which are worth only as
much as the credibility of the witness delivering them, should be subject to
cross-examination because the outcome of the hearing rides on the weight
given to these statements.224
The other instance in which cross-examination may be necessary
occurs in cases where effective rebuttal of the evidence, by way of crossexamination, would affect the severity of the punishment imposed on the
student.225 In Winnick v. Manning,226 the accused student wished to refute
the dean’s testimony that characterized the student as the “ringleader” of the
disruption giving rise to the disciplinary hearing.227 The Second Circuit
explained that even if the tribunal believed that the student truly was the
ringleader of the disruptive conduct, and that perception may have been
disproved through the use of cross-examination, the accused student did not
receive a heftier penalty than those who were not characterized as “ringleaders.”228 Because the use of cross-examination would not have affected
the student’s punishment, even if he had been able to disprove his role as
ringleader, “no useful purpose would have been served by permitting
Winnick to cross-examine Dean Hewes.”229 Therefore, due process did not
220. See, e.g., Winnick v. Manning, 460 F.2d 545, 549-50 (2d Cir. 1972) (discussing the
proposition that cross-examination is necessary to achieve fairness in a university disciplinary
hearing where there are serious issues as to witness credibility).
221. Id. at 549 (citation omitted).
222. Id.
223. Id. at 550.
224. Id. at 549.
225. Id.
226. 460 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1972).
227. Winnick, 460 F.2d at 549.
228. Id.
229. Id. The critical fact in this case was not what role the student played in the alleged
misconduct, but rather whether he participated in the alleged misconduct. Id. at 549-50.
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require cross-examination of witnesses at the student’s disciplinary
hearing.230
Ultimately, whether cross-examination is essential to a fair hearing
depends on the unique circumstances of each disciplinary hearing.231 If
cross-examination is required to determine the weight evidence should be
given based on the credibility of the witnesses, cross-examination is likely
an essential element of due process.232 If cross-examination would allow
the student to prove or disprove facts that would affect the severity of her
punishment, it would likely be instrumental in achieving due process.233
Without a showing that cross-examination materially affects the weight of
the evidence, or has great potential to prove or disprove facts that will affect
the severity of the student’s punishment or the outcome of the hearing
altogether, cross-examination is probably not a due process requirement in a
university disciplinary hearing.234
VII. IMPARTIAL DECISION MAKERS
“While there remain many vexing questions as to what due process
requires in school disciplinary proceedings, a fundamental requirement is
that a hearing must be accorded before an impartial decision maker.”235
University disciplinary hearings, without a doubt, require that the student
can plead her story to an unbiased tribunal.236
In Nash, several students alleged that the university violated their rights
to due process during their administrative hearings because the university
failed to provide an impartial hearing body.237 The Eleventh Circuit explained that “an impartial decision maker [i]s an essential guarantee of due
process.”238 The students alleged a constitutional due process violation;
they alleged that they were deprived of an impartial tribunal.239 This allegation arose from the “emotionally charged atmosphere” surrounding the
supposed academic dishonesty committed by the students before the

230. Id. at 550.
231. Nash v. Auburn Univ., 812 F.2d 655, 663-64 (11th Cir. 1987).
232. See, e.g., Donohue v. Baker, 976 F. Supp. 136, 147 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (quoting Winnick,
460 F.2d at 550) (“[I]f a case is essentially one of credibility, the ‘cross-examination of witnesses
might [be] essential to a fair hearing.’”).
233. Winnick, 460 F.2d at 449-50.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 448.
236. Winnick, 460 F.2d at 548.
237. Nash v. Auburn Univ., 812 F.2d 655, 665-66 (11th Cir. 1987).
238. Id. at 665.
239. Id.
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hearing was administered.240 The students also alleged the tribunal may not
have been neutral because, at the hearing, it heard evidence that was both
irrelevant and highly prejudicial.241 The students further alleged one particular member of the hearing body lacked impartiality because he failed to
recuse himself during the hearing; this tribunal member had prior
knowledge of the charge of academic dishonesty and other alleged facts to
support the accusations before the administrative hearing was conducted.242
However, the Nash court concluded that none of these allegations
provided a legitimate basis upon which to find that the students were
afforded a less than fair hearing because of a biased tribunal.243 The court
found that the atmosphere before the hearing, emotionally charged or
otherwise, was not a problem constituting bias that was captured anywhere
in the record of the hearing.244 The fact that there may have been some
controversy on campus surrounding the allegations of academic dishonesty
was not enough for the court to draw the inference that the tribunal was
unfairly prejudiced by the controversy.245 The court explained that “[a]ny
alleged prejudice . . . must be evident from the record and cannot be based
in speculation or inference.”246 The court further found that no other
evidence showed that the hearing body made any decisions about the
students’ guilt before the hearing was completed.247
The Nash court also dismissed the students’ arguments alleging the
tribunal’s prejudice because of the admission of irrelevant or highly
prejudicial evidence as well.248 The court found that the evidentiary rules in
university disciplinary hearings need not conform to the more rigid and
formal rules of judicial courtrooms.249 The court stated that the university
and the hearing body had a great deal of latitude in admitting evidence
under the flexible framework of due process in this setting, and therefore,
concluded that the allegedly prejudicial evidence did not affect the ability of
the tribunal to come to an impartial conclusion.250

240. Id.
241. Id. The hearing body was presented with and accepted evidence relating to the
students’ conduct during prior exams rather than the exam in question. Id.
242. Id. at 666.
243. Id. at 665.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 665-66.
249. Id. at 665. The court observed that the evidence may have been permissible in a judicial
proceeding, even with the protections of formal rules of evidence. Id.
250. Id. at 665-66.
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Finally, with respect to the hearing body member who had some
knowledge of the charges and allegations before the hearing but did not
recuse himself, the Eleventh Circuit found that the record did not
demonstrate any prejudice on his part.251 The court also explained that it
had already “refused ‘to establish a per se rule that would disqualify
administrative hearing bodies . . . solely for the reason that . . . some of [the
members] participated in the initial investigation of the incident and
initiation of the cause under consideration.”252 Allegations that the hearing
body member was involved in the investigation, had prior knowledge of the
charges, and had possibly been privy to some of the evidence were not
enough for the Nash court to find prejudice and lack of sufficient process.253
Other courts, however, have been more concerned with the impartiality
issue. For instance, in Center for Participant Education v. Marshall,254 a
federal district court left some room to contest the impartiality of a
tribunal.255 When allegations of prejudice and fundamental unfairness were
premised on the school’s seemingly conflicting roles as both prosecutor and
adjudicator, the court stated that unfairness was not evident “in the absence
of a showing of other circumstances such as malice or personal interest in
the outcome of the case.”256 While the court found that the tribunal was not
biased in this case, it acknowledged that there was certainly the potential for
instances in which malice or personal stake could create a serious bias in
the tribunal, and therefore, the hearing would fail to provide sufficient
process.
In Winnick, the Second Circuit also suggested that some solid evidence,
beyond mere employment or administrative capacity within the university,
must be introduced to show bias on the part of the hearing body or one of
its members.257 There would have to be evidence demonstrating that the
tribunal member was incapable of impartial application of rules and
regulations governing the hearing,258 or that the member “observed,
investigated, or made [some] prehearing decisions” about the accused. 259
Thus, if a student can demonstrate that the tribunal member participated in
much of the investigation leading up to the hearing, or that the tribunal

251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

Id.
Id. at 666 (citing Duke v. N. Tex. State Univ., 469 F.2d 829, 834 (5th Cir. 1973)).
Id.
337 F. Supp. 126 (N.D. Fla. 1972).
Ctr. for Participant Educ., 337 F. Supp. at 135.
Id. (quoting Jones v. State Bd. of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190, 200 (M.D. Tenn. 1968)).
Winnick v. Manning, 460 F.2d 545, 548 (2d Cir. 1972).
Id.
Id.
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member unfairly administered the university’s rules and regulations
governing the hearing, a court may very well find that a due process
violation occurred.
The mere allegation of impropriety based on the position of the
tribunal member with respect to the university, or even the fact that the
adjudicator might also be the prosecutor, is not by itself enough to reach the
conclusion that a university disciplinary hearing lacked impartiality.260
Further, without some record or evidence of actual prejudice, malice, or
personal interest, a tribunal member may be allowed, at least to some
degree, to investigate the alleged events giving rise to the hearing and
initiate the hearing process; arguably, the hearing body is still impartial so
long as that decision maker does not come to any conclusions about the
guilt or innocence of the accused student before the disciplinary hearing is
completed.261
VIII. CONCLUSION
Constitution or no, it is hardly thinkable that we would deny to today’s
generation of students . . . procedural fairness.262
In the forty-five years following the student-friendly landmark decision
in Dixon, the hypothetical student discussed in the introduction, and many
in the real world, should relax a bit about the over-bearing, parent-like
universities of the past as they stroll through their campus days.263 Or
should they?264
Although the courts have made great strides in the quest to treat
university students like other adults who have certain constitutionally
protected rights or interests, it still seems as though there are several issues
that might make a student’s skin crawl in a university disciplinary hearing.
Despite the growing importance of education, the Constitution does not

260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Wright, supra note 18, at 1086.
263. See, e.g., Booker v. Lehigh Univ., 800 F. Supp. 234, 238-39 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (explaining
that students in contemporary academic disciplinary settings are afforded far greater rights than
students of the past because the formerly “authoritarian” nature of universities has been “diluted”
to a large degree at present).
264. See, e.g., Gabrilowitz v. Newman, 582 F.2d 100, 104 (1st Cir. 1978) (holding that the
assistance of counsel may only be a fundamental aspect of due process if there is a pending
criminal charge, the implication of the Fifth Amendment, or serious issues as to the credibility of
witnesses).
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protect students against procedures that are “unwise,” “floor-level,” or
“minimal.” 265
At present, the only protections that students must be afforded in every
serious university disciplinary hearing are: notice, a hearing, a finding of
guilt based only on substantial evidence, and written findings and record of
the proceeding.266 There is still disagreement as to whether an attorney
should be afforded to students, and, if an attorney is provided, there are
questions as to the scope of the role that attorney may assume.267 Crossexamination may also be limited depending on the particular circumstances
of each case.268
The United States Supreme Court stated in 1943 that “[t]he history of
liberty has largely been the history of observance of procedural safeguards.”269 Yet, while there is a recognition that “the risk of error [in these
proceedings] is not at all trivial,” contemporary courts will affirm suspensions and expulsions from universities that employ procedures which are
“far from ideal” or meet only “the lowest level” of fairness acceptable under
the Due Process Clause.270 It is encouraging that the Fourteenth Amendment has become more protective of the rights of post-secondary students
over the last several decades, but still very troubling that students are only
entitled to the most rudimentary levels of fairness acceptable under the
Constitution.
Elizabeth Ledgerwood Pendlay∗

265. See Flaim v. Med. Coll. of Ohio, 418 F.3d 629, 636 (6th Cir. 2005) (distinguishing
between disciplinary procedures that are “wise” but not “constitutionally required” because the
Due Process Clause sets only “the floor or lowest level of procedures acceptable”).
266. See Keene v. Rogers, 316 F. Supp. 217, 221 (N.D. Me. 1970) (listing the minimum
requirements to achieve due process in a university disciplinary hearing). But see Flaim, 418 F.3d
at 636 (finding that even a record of the proceeding may not be constitutionally required in all
university disciplinary cases).
267. See supra note 160.
268. See, e.g., Nash v. Auburn Univ., 812 F.2d 655, 663-65 (11th Cir. 1987) (discussing the
situations in which due process may or may not require an opportunity for the students to crossexamine witnesses.)
269. McNabb v. Unites States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943).
270. Flaim, 418 F.3d at 636, 642.
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